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Little Red Riding Hood and the Chomskyan





The present article discusses the empirical validity of the so-called poverty
of the stimulus argument within nativist accounts of first language acquisi-
tion. Arguments against nativism in early linguistic development are given,
which draw from the premises that: a) the linguistic stimulus that infants
are exposed to is not as impoverished as linguists had initially stated, and
b) infants’ learning capacities have been grossly underestimated, since they
do possess abilities that allow them to extract the relevant features they need
from the input and, thus, acquire grammatical knowledge.
Once upon a time, there was a sweet little girl. Whoever laid eyes upon her
could not help but love her. But it was her grandmother who loved her most. She
could never give the child enough. One day she gave the girl a present: a red
hooded cape, made of velvet. And since it was so becoming and the girl insisted
on always wearing it, she was called Little Red Riding Hood.
Unfortunately, due to a blood clot in the brain, Little Red’s grandmother had
part of her body paralyzed. Consequently, she had to sit or lie in bed all day long.
She also lost language. She could understand quite a lot of what she heard but she
hardly spoke. However, the doctor said that, with time and with the right treatment,
she might show a slight recovery from aphasia one day.
One day, Little Red’s mother prepared mashed potatoes. She said to her daugh-
ter:
‘Come, Little Red! Take this tupperware of mashed potatoes and this bottle of
wine and take them to your grandmother. She’s feeling sick and weak, and this
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will strengthen her. Be sure to tell her about your progress at school, she will be
happy to hear that and, besides, hearing samples of language input will help her
recover from aphasia. Get an early start, before it gets hot, and when you’re out in
the woods, be nice and good and don’t stray from the path’.
‘I’ll do just as you say’, Little Red promised her mother.
The grandmother lived out in the forest, half an hour from the village. As soon
as Little Red entered the forest, she encountered the wolf. However, Little Red
did not know what a wicked and Chomskyan sort of an animal he was and was
therefore not afraid of him.
‘Good morning, Little Red’, he said.
‘Thank you kindly, wolf!’ ‘Where are you going so early, Little Red?’ ‘To
Grandmother’s’. ‘Little Red, I wonder which things John said that Mary thinks
who the men expected to see that somebody must have put ___ under your apron,
with wh-movement of "which things" to Spec, CP’.
‘I beg your pardon?’
‘Under your apron. . . what is it that you are carrying?’
‘Oh! Mashed potatoes and wine. My grandmother’s sick and weak, and yester-
day we made this so it will help her get well’.
‘Where does your grandmother live, Little Red?’
‘Another quarter of an hour’s walk from here through the forest. Her house is
under the three big oak trees. You can tell which one it is bythe hazel bushes’, said
Little Red.
The wolf thought to himself, ‘This tender young thing is a juicy morsel. She’ll
taste even better than the old woman. I’ve got to be real crafty if I want to catch
them both!’
Then he made a wolf -movement and walked next to Little Red, leaving a wolf -
trace behind him. He told her, ‘Little Red, just look at the beautiful flowers and
plants that are growing all around you! Why don’t you look around? You march
along as if you were going straight to school, and yet it’s so delightful out here in
the woods, watching colorless green ideas sleep furiously!’
Little Red, who was full of botanic sensitivity, looked around and saw how the
rays of the sun were dancing through the trees back and forth and how the woods
were full of beautiful flowers. So, she thought to herself, ‘If I bring Grandmother
a bunch of fresh flowers, she’ll certainly love that. It’s still early, and I’ll arrive on
time’. So she ran off the path and plunged deeper and deeper into the woods to
look for flowers.
While Little Red spent her time walking around, taking redundant maximal
paths and looking for flowers, the wolf took the Minimalist Path (MP), with no
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flowers or any other redundancies, which took him right to the grandmother’s house
long before Little Red could ever have arrived.
Once there, the wolf lifted the latch, and the grandmother’s door sprang open.
Then he went straight to the grandmother’s bed without saying a word. He caught
her and locked her in the deep structure of a big wardrobe, planning to spell her
out later on, once Little Red had already arrived, so that he could eat them both
together.
Meanwhile, Little Red had been running around and looking for flowers, and
only when she had gathered as many as she could carry did she remember her
grandmother and continue on the way to her house again. She found the door open,
and she entered. Next, she went to the bed and drew back the curtains. There lay
her grandmother, with her sleeping cap pulled down over her face, giving her a
strange appearance.
‘Dear Grandma, how are you today?’, asked Little Red.
To that question, the wolf uttered a long and fluent answer about his health, full
of IP and CP projections and with all the corresponding functional categories in it.
Although he was faking the grandmother’s voice, he didn’t really sound aphasic at
all. Little Red stared in wonder.
‘Wow!’, said Little Red, at last, ‘that was actually quite well said! But Granny,
how did you manage to acquire such a complex linguistic system in such a short
period of time?’
‘It is not only me, my dear, everyone can! Language acquisition is a snap, as
many scientists would claim!’, answered the wolf.
‘But how is it, that you actually relearned language so quickly? Did any magi-
cian help you?
‘My sweet and innocent child!’, exclaimed the wolf, ‘don’t you know that lan-
guages are never learned or relearned? Language is unlearnable, language is innate,
my dear! We come to this world with linguistic knowledge in our brain already. It’s
our language organ, it’s part of our genetic endowment, we just have to let it grow
(Anderson & Lightfoot 2000). It’s no magician: it’s Universal Grammar!’
‘Haven’t you heard about the poverty of the stimulus argument, my dear? There
must be innate linguistic knowledge, indeed, because complex linguistic forms de-
velop extremely rapidly, as you very well noted, and the input available to any
language learner is both incomplete and sparsely represented, compared to one’s
linguistic abilities’.
‘Oh! But, I came precisely to talk to you, so that you could have some linguistic
input from which to extract some of the properties needed for language develop-
ment!’
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‘Oh, my dear! Don’t you see? Linguistic knowledge is perfect, and it is impos-
sible to extract perfect knowledge from the imperfect data that constitutes language
input. Input really cannot be the main source of language development. "A strik-
ing property of language acquisition is that children attain knowledge that, quite
literally, infinitely surpasses their actual experience" (Anderson & Lightfoot 2000,
699).’
‘I see’, Little Red replied. ‘Does that mean, therefore, that we do not learn the
basic syntactic properties of natural languages from the input we hear?’
‘Exactly!’, said the wolf. ‘Even if children could have learned that the adult
grammar has U (given the right data), it does not follow - and it may not be at all
plausible - that they acquired a grammar with U by learning. The requisite data may
be unavailable to children (or anyone but trained linguists); available data might
not be utilizable (by children); or the data might not be sufficiently ubiquitous to
account for the knowledge of property U by all normal children, especially with
respect to aspects of grammar where very young children exhibit adult linguistic
competence" (Crain & Pietroski 2001, 151). So, quite clearly, this proves that we
know things that we could not have learned from inductive observation of the input
or from any available teaching’.
‘But Granny, can you tell me what are these things that we know so well and
that we could have never learned from the input? Can you give me any specific
example?’, asked Little Red.
‘Well’, the wolf replied, ‘just take the example of auxiliary sequences in English
(Kimball 1973). How can English-speaking children learn that sentences like (1)
are in fact grammatical?’
(1) It may have been raining.
‘I don’t know’, said Little Red. ’How can they?’
‘They can’t! That is precisely the point, my dear. Children know that sentences
with a finite auxiliary plus two nonfinite auxiliaries plus a nonauxiliary verb in
sequence are grammatical, and they know what the right order is, out of all the
logically possible orders, without being presented with crucial evidence. Quite
clearly, the ambient language is not sufficient to learn this grammatical feature
from experience alone.’
‘But Grandma’, protested Little Red, ’sentences like the one you used in (1)
are actually very common in a normal English-speaking environment. Pullum and
Scholz (2002) found quite a lot of examples like yours! They checked! In fact,
I myself found a bunch of them in a Fairy Tale Corpus1 that I put together for
school! Look!’
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dealt out its blows as before, and MIGHT have been dealing them to this
he plunged boldly in. How long he might have been walking there he never
awaywho can tell how long they might have been living there?when the
Back: it was so wet, it certainly must have been raining. "Yes, that it
and declared that her daughter must have been meddling with it, for it
which convinced him that he must have been dreaming before. However,
events of the night, thinking he must have been dreaming; but for all
quiet enough. He thought that he must have been dreaming, and fell asleep
ess drew a long breath "Then I must have been eating MOUSE! ...NO
going to shed tin-tears; but that would not have been fitting for a
took back to the place where they should have been feeding, for here he
Table 1: Examples of occurrences of auxiliary verb sequences from an AntConc window.
‘Oh, well!’, exclaimed the wolf. ’But we are mainly interested in finding plau-
sible evidence in the input which is available to all children, since all children
eventually acquire language. Those fairy tales of yours may be available to some
children, not all!’
‘That is quite true’, admitted Little Red, ’but still, you cannot claim that evi-
dence for these structures is completely absent from the input or from anybody’s
linguistic experience!’
‘Right. In any case, the problem with the stimulus is not only that it is too im-
poverished in that what people know extends beyond the samples they are exposed
to. The input is also too rich, in a way, since it affords incorrect inductive general-
izations that children never make. Consider an example of a hypothesis like “move
the first auxiliary verb to form yes/no-questions”. It would yield the right results
for cases like the following (Crain & Pietroski 2001, 163)’:
(2) a. Bill can play the sax.
b. Can Bill play the sax?
(3) a. The sky is blue.
b. Is the sky blue?
‘It looks like evidence available from the input would support this hypothesis.
However, is this hypothesis correct? Bear in mind, my dear girl, that in some
cases, fronting the first auxiliary verb is impossible’:
(4) a. The man who is beating a donkey is mean.
b. Is the man who is beating a donkey mean?
c. *Is the man who beating a donkey is mean?
‘And do you know why this is so, my dear child? Because there’s the so-called
Head Movement Constraint! The attentive girl that you are, you must have seen
that heads of phrases can only move locally. Movement of the auxiliary verb in the
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(1) Is he who is only half a man to get the best?
(2) Was the sleep he had last night not enough for him?
(3) Shall a creature that I bought for an eighth trouble me from morning till night?
(4) Did not the young man who brought the dagger call him whom your majesty
believes to be your son Labakan, and say he was a crazy tailor?
(5) Could the voice which had bewitched Alonzo have come from one of these?
(6) Have the two rascals who are my prisoners dared to play me such a trick as this?
Table 2: Examples of occurrences of main auxiliary fronting taken from Fairy Tale Corpus
(see footnote 1)
relative clause would violate this constraint because such movement would cross
the heads of two other phrasal projections (Crain & Pietroski 2001). Now the
point is, my dear child, whether all children who form yes/no-questions in an adult
fashion have been exposed to enough evidence of the relevant sort’.
‘Grandma, there are indeed plenty of examples of questions like yours in (4b),
from which children can infer that it is the main auxiliary verb that is to be fronted,
and not the first auxiliary verb that occurs in a word sequence. In fact, I’ve got
many of those as well from my Fairy Tale Corpus! Look!’
At this point, the wolf started to get angry. He shouted, ‘Stop it! Will you stop
talking about your silly Fairy Tale Corpus? I told you before, it is not relevant here.
You cannot prove that all children have been exposed to the necessary evidence
with that corpus thing! Besides, provided some children had access to some evi-
dence that would allow them make some generalizations about some grammatical
properties of their language, what does this prove? What about the exceptions to
the grammatical rules?’
‘No, no, my dear child, we still need innate linguistic knowledge to explain
children’s ultimate steady state. We might have evidence for some generalizations,
all right, but we do not have enough evidence for where these generalizations break
down! “As children, we come to know the generalizations and their exceptions, and
we come to this knowledge quickly and uniformly. Yet our linguistic experience
is not rich enough to determine the limits to the generalizations´´ (Anderson &
Lightfoot 1999, 701)’.
‘I’ll give you another example, my dear child, because I can see you’re rather
lost by now. Consider the following examples, not taken from a silly childish Fairy
Tale Corpus, but from the wise academic work of some sound scientists (Crain &
Pietroski 2001, 156-157)’:
(5) The Ninja Turtlei danced while hei/j ate pizza.
(6) While hei ate pizza, the Ninja Turtlei/j danced.
‘You see, my dear child, that in (5) and (6), the pronoun he may or may not be
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dependent on the referential expression the Ninja Turtle. In (7), however, referential
dependence is impossible. (7) is unambiguous, it only has the (a)-reading’:
(7) He danced while the Ninja Turtle ate pizza.
a. Hei danced while the Ninja Turtle j ate pizza.
b. *Hei danced while the Ninja Turtlei ate pizza.
‘Sweet Little Red’, continued the wolf, ’the relevant constraint here is Principle
C of the Binding Theory. It prohibits backwards anaphora in (7). That is, the
constraint does not allow coindexing a pronoun and a referring expression when the
pronoun c-commands the expression. If child grammars lacked Principle C, then
(7) would be ambiguous, since the (7b)-reading should be available for children.
However, it is not (Crain & Pietroski 2001)’.
‘But Granny’, replied Little Red, ’wouldn’t it be possible that young children
could actually figure out that a referentially dependent term must be c-commanded
by its antecedent?’
‘I’m afraid this is not possible’, continued the wolf. ‘This would require figur-
ing out a good deal of syntax! Humans must have a priori knowledge of the rele-
vant principle of the Binding Theory, making it both unnecessary and impossible
for children to consider grammars that do not respect these constraints. Children
never consider hypotheses at odds with the principles of Universal Grammar! "This
suggests an acquisition scenario according to which children are guided by innate
knowledge" (Crain & Pietroski 2001, 159)’.
‘Ooohhh!! I’m impressed!’, said Little Red. ‘But Grandma, there might actu-
ally be a better solution, don’t you think? I’ve heard about this situation before,
that in which a subset of input has two possible formal descriptions, and the infant
learner has to choose one of them... the induction problem, they call it!’
‘Exactly!’, said the wolf, ‘and what does the infant learner do, in that situa-
tion? He chooses the formal description which is constrained by the principles of
Universal Grammar! Isn’t that great?’
‘My dear Granny, with all due respect, but I don’t think you need any UG
constraint to explain that. Actually, there’s this nice paper I read (Gerken, in press)
where they perform an experiment with artificial language to test the induction
problem, using the very same data that Marcus and his colleagues (Marcus et al.,
1999) used in their own study. They presented nine-month-old children with stimuli
that exhibited an AAB pattern, but they also ended in syllable -di. Thus, both
descriptions (i.e. follows AAB pattern" and ends in -di) would allow learners to
generalize beyond the particular syllable to which they were exposed to a new set
of syllable strings’.
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‘Well, Grandma, the results in this experiment showed that infants made only
the generalization involving the position of the syllable -di. It appears as though
learners would compare the subset of the input they have received to the range of in-
put generated by the two different formal descriptions. Then, learners would make
one of the two generalizations tested, the one that is most statistically consistent
with the particular subset of the data they received!’
‘Oh, well’, said the wolf, ‘I’m sure this friend of yours... what was her name,
again? Gerken? Well, I’m sure she’s a very nice and well-intentioned girl, but she
clearly has no idea of what language acquisition is about! Statistically consistent,
she said? For Chomsky’s sake! How can one talk about statistics when dealing with
a scientific discipline like Linguistics! I’m afraid you’ll have to accept that the fact
that essential aspects of grammar are innate is the only viable explanation for how
languages can be acquired so quickly yet under such impoverished conditions’.
‘But Grandma’, protested Little Red, ‘this statistics thingy is in fact really cool!
They say that speech contains “a host of statistical regularities that are sufficient to
support the kind of robust learning observed in neural networks. This knowledge
has emerged from the analysis of huge computerized corpora of written and spoken
language, revealing regularities that are not visible to the naked eye. Chomsky’s
belief in the impoverished nature of linguistic input holds only if we look “locally”
at relatively short segments of speech. Such imperfections wash out with a large
enough sample”! (Bates & Elman 1996, 1849)’.
‘My dear, sweet child’, said the wolf, ’forget about statistics! The fact that
languages exhibit properties for which there is no evidence in the input is an un-
questionable truth! There cannot be any overt evidence for the kinds of abstract un-
derlying structures characteristic of grammatical theory. How is a child supposed
to know what a Noun or a Verb is? And you definitely need grammatical categories
to form phrases, and phrases to project into larger phrases and sentences!’
‘Yes Granny, we do need grammatical categories, what we don’t need is innate
grammatical categories, because distributional information might play a very im-
portant role in categorizing words! Mintz et al. (2002) carried out an experiment
to test whether grammatical categories could be learned through a distributional
analysis of the input. In fact, grammatical categories could be well defined by
similarities in word patterning! Consider the example in (8)’:
(8) The dog is barking at the moon.
‘Both dog and moon are preceded by the. And they are also preceded by the same
words across many sentences. This similarity would lead them to be classified
together (Mintz et al. 2002)’.
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‘My dear child’, replied the wolf, ’do not trust such distributional analyses be-
cause they do not always give you the right results! Consider the following exam-
ples’:
(9) a. John ate fish
b. John ate bread
c. John can fish
d. *John can bread.
‘See the problem, dear girl?’, continued the wolf. ‘A distributional learner would
incorrectly categorize fish and bread together and, hearing (9c), she would incor-
rectly assume that (9d) is also possible!’
‘Yes Granny, I do see the problem!’, answered Little Red. ‘In fact, it is also cap-
tured by Mintz and his colleagues (Mintz et al. 2002, 396). However, according to
them, if fish were the only word in the corpus to share any distribution with bread,
then yes, you were right, maybe bread would be assigned the same categorization
as fish, and it would be incorrectly classified as both a Noun and a Verb, and sen-
tences like (9d) would be permissible. But Mintz et al. (2002) suggest that in any
sizable corpus of actual speech directed at young children, bread will share many
more distributional characteristics with words used as nouns only. This would sta-
tistically override any marginal effects produced by sequences like (9a-c). It really
looks like the frequencies of sequences that could lead to wrong generalizations in
this case are low enough, compared to those that lead to correct ones, as to have
little or no effect on categorization outcomes!’
‘Well, my dear’, said the wolf, ‘there is still another problem which neither
you nor your friends might have captured! Important distributional regularities are
often not local, but occur over a variable distance!’
(10) The big fluffy brown and not so thin dog is barking at the moon.
‘How is the learner supposed to know which co-occurrences are important and
which should be ignored, dear child? Distributional analyses that consider all the
possible relations among words in a corpus of sentences would be impossible, my
dear!’
‘Well, Grandma’, continued Little Red, ’Mintz el al. (2002) have also captured
this problem, and their results show that it is actually possible! They analyzed
first the distributional context of a word based only on the immediately preceding
and following words. Then, they extended the same procedure to analyze larger
distributional window sizes (two words to the right and left of a target word, and
eight words to the right and left of a target word). All of the input for their analyses
c©2006 Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona
9
Barcelona English Language and Literature Studies
consisted of utterances taken from the CHILDES database directed at children less
than 2.5 years old’.
‘Well, Granny, you’ll be surprised to hear that their analysis yielded successful
categorization using various window sizes. I agree categorization was not 100%
correct in all cases, but the idea is that an analysis based on distributional similarity
has a very strong tendency to cluster nouns with other nouns and verbs with other
verbs. The accidental exclusion of linguistically informative co-occurrences and
the accidental inclusion of irrelevant co-occurrences resulting from defining con-
texts by immediate adjacency did not significantly distort the results (Mintz et al.
2002)’.
’So, you see, Grandma, the input is not quite as impoverished and degenerate!
“iven a learner who is predisposed to calculate distributions over words, the input
contains information from which the grammatical categories of at least nouns and
verbs could be constructed” (Mintz et al. 2002, 419)’.
‘My dear Little Red...’, said the wolf, ‘then, you are assuming that there are
indeed learners who are predisposed to calculate distributions over words! And
what if there aren’t any? Let me warn you, my dear child, that young learners are
poor learners! The presence of a rich input does not guarantee that children can
make appropriate use of it! "One must distinguish between the mere availability of
data and the utility of that data for children. It is not enough that there are facts that
would help children learn language. Children must be able to recognize and make
use of these facts" (Crain & Pietroski 2001, 149). I’m sorry to tell you, my dear,
but the evidence seems overwhelming that fundamental aspects of our language are
not acquired by learning, but are determined as part of our biological endowment
instead’.
‘Oh, Grandma!’, cried Little Red, ‘young children are not as bad learners as
people initially claimed! Children are capable of extracting more from their ex-
perience than one might think. Take the Saffran et al. (1996) paper, for example!
They claim that "infants possess powerful mechanisms suited to learning the types
of structures exemplified in linguistic systems"! (Saffran et al. 1996, 1927)’.
‘I know you said before that you didn’t like statistics Granny, but Saffran and
her colleagues conducted an experiment in which they proved that eight-month-
old infants could extract information about word boundaries on the basis of the
sequential statistics of concatenated speech! In their experiment, children were not
provided with any acoustic information about word boundaries. The only cues to
word boundaries were the transitional probabilities between syllable pairs, which
were higher within words than between words. And guess what! Eight-month-old
infants were able to extract information about sequential statistics from only two
minutes of listening experience! Ain’t that cool?!’
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‘The Saffran et al. (1996) paper!’, exclaimed the wolf, ‘I knew you would men-
tion it sooner or later! You might not have realized about this yet, my dear, but what
these experiments do not show is that a learner with no innate predispositions could
extract from the stream of speech alone the principle of assigning word boundaries!
The learner must be built from the beginning to use this procedure to discover lin-
guistic units. Otherwise, language acquisition would be impossible! This is were
the real poverty of the stimulus lies: language data do not come packaged with in-
structions for their own analysis. Learners must approach the data with prior innate
constraints (Clark et al. 1997)’.
“‘Nobody denies that the child must extract information from the environment;
it is no revelation that there is learning in that technical sense”. But the point is,
my dear child, "that there is more to language acquisition than this. Children react
to evidence in accordance with some specific principles" (Anderson & Lightfoot
2000, 710). Thus, linguistic structure cannot be learned through unguided analyses
of input sentences, no matter how complex these analyses may be. Such analyses
must, in a way, be guided and oriented by innate predispositions of the learner’.
‘But Grandma!’, exclaimed Little Red, ’those innate predispositions of the
learner that you are mentioning now are rather different from innate knowledge
of linguistic principles! You’ve been claiming over and over that humans possess a
small set of innately specified parameters that make language acquisition possible.
But one thing is to say that there is something innate about language acquisition
and another rather different thing is to claim that grammatical knowledge itself is
innate!’
‘Dear Grandma, there must be, indeed, something innate about language acqui-
sition. But what is innate about language cannot be determined unless we explore
the role of experience to its limits! The statistical learning approach does not deny
that children are born with capacities that make language learning possible. It just
questions whether these capacities include knowledge of linguistic universals per
se. Innate capacities may simply consist of particular sensitivities toward particular
types of information inherent in the environment, rather than a priori knowledge of
grammar itself (Seidenberg 1997)’.
‘But what does this finding tell you about a learner’s steady state, anyway?’,
asked the wolf, ’Saffran et al. (1996) suggest that if children can learn words by
recording frequent sound sequences, they might learn grammar the same way. But
learning words is one thing, and learning grammar is another thing! The sequence
of sounds making up a word cannot be captured by rules. However, the sequence
of words making up a sentence can be captured by rules. Thus, learning words and
learning grammar are two very different computational problems (Pinker 1997)’.
While Little Red and the wolf were having this discussion, the forest ranger
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happened to be around. Being the forest superhero that he was, it occurred to him
that the grandmother would he happy to have someone to talk to, so he decided to
pay her a visit. He took the Minimalist Path, not because he was a Chomskyan, but
because he lacked botanic sensitivity and did not care for flowers at all.
He went in and found Little Red and the wolf, who was still wearing the grand-
mother’s clothes, arguing. He shouted, ’shut up and leave this girl alone! How dare
you? How can you question such important new findings about statistical learning
in infants? Nobody questions the statistical properties of language nowadays! Even
Chomsky once said, "given the grammar of a language, one can study the use of the
language statistically in various ways, and the development of probabilistic models
for the use of language (as distinct from the syntactic structure of language) can be
quite rewarding"! (Chomsky 1965 quoted in Seidenberg 1997, note 24)’.
‘And how dare you say that identifying word boundaries and learning gram-
mar are two completely different computational problems?! "Distinguishing words
from other words in the stream of speech is a basic syntactic ability: if one cannot
segment sound strings into word strings, then there can be no syntax. This is not
the only skill involved in synctactic processing, but it is one of the most basic, to
be sure" (Hilferty 2003, 192)’.
The wolf was so shocked at the appearance of the ranger and his impressive
words, that he fainted. Then, Little Red and the forest superhero tied his legs, so
that he couldn’t run away, and released the grandmother from the deep structure of
the wardrobe, where she had been trapped all this time.
Little Red promised not to stray from the path by herself ever again and to carry
on further research on statistical learning by infants and the notion of bootstrapping
and the mechanisms that young children use to extract specific types of information
from the linguistic input in order to determine the particular regularities which
constitute the grammar of their language.
As to the wolf, traditional stories would say that he died or was killed in some
way. However, this is the 21st century and present-day animal rights activists would
never accept that wolves sometimes should be killed (not even Chomskyan wolves).
Besides, the forest guy, who was supposed to be the one to kill him, was too busy
having his grandmother’s mashed potatoes, because they reminded so much of his
own mother’s. Thus, the wolf was taken to a laboratory where he was forced to
volunteer to do some neuroimaging experiments.
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